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I. NOMINAL AND EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES
The type of theoretical and empirical analysis that would be appropriate for
many issues must often be significantly modified in the presence of a com-
plicated Phase II regime. In the case of devaluation in a QR context, deficit
reduction may not be the major criterion for evaluating the effects of devalua-
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Chapter 5
Measuring Changes in
Exchange Rates
The background has now been established to analyze the policies comprising
the devaluation packages in each of the twenty-two Phase III episodes covered
by the country studies. In this chapter, focus is upon economically meaningful
measurement of exchange rate changes in each case. Chapter 6 is devoted to an
analysis of how these changes affect liberalization, bias reduction, rationaliza-
tion, and reduced variance in effective protection accorded by the regime to
different sectors and subsectors of the economy.
The first section of this chapter presents estimates of the changes in
nominal and effective exchange rates that represented the gross and net
devaluations in the Phase III episodes analyzed in the country studies. The
next section covers the relationship between the nominal and effective ex-
change rate changes and the real exchange rate. Concern in this chapter is with
the measurement of the "impact" variables in Phase III episodes and not with
their effects. Later chapters are devoted, to investigating the effects of the
policy measures that comprise Phase III, but that can be done only after the
changes in other policy instruments also in the devaluation package are review-
ed.
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tion, and such effects as premium reduction must be taken into account. Con-
siderations such these require modification of the basic theory, and the
parameters relevant for empirical work must be correspondingly amended.
There is nothing in the nature of QR regimes that requires any change in
theory about exchange rates. However, Phase II regimes often have a number
of price measures superimposed on the basic parity exchange rate, so that the
nominal price of foreign exchange does not reflect the actual amount of local
currency paid or received per unit of foreign exchange.' It is this amount, not
"the" exchange rate, that is theoretically relevant and should be measured.2
This section examines the phenomena that give rise to differences between
nominal and effective exchange rates and to differences between the
magnitudes of net and gross devaluation. In practice, of course, there is not a
single EER, either for imports or for exports. For present purposes, however,
it will be convenient to discuss "the" import EER and "the" export EER.
Changes among EERs for different categories of exports and imports are ex-
amined in 6.
Definitions
It is useful to begin by precisely defining the various exchange rate concepts.3
Let:
E, = the parity at time t, i.e., the number of units of local currency per
unit of foreign exchange at the official exchange rate (also called
the nominal exchange rate).4
EER, = the effective exchange rate for the ith transaction category at time
t
t.
= the value of all surcharges against imports of commodity i per
dollar c.i.f. expressed as a percentage of the c.i.f. price. Omission
of the subscript i implies the average rate for all imports.
p, = the domestic price of the ith commodity.
= the foreign price of the ith commodity expressed in foreign cur-
rency.
= the value of export encouragement schemes, other than outright
subsidies, per dollar of exports f.o.b. of the ith export category
expressed as a percent of the f.o.b. price. Omission of the
subscript i yields "the" export rate.
= the subsidy (or tax, in which case s, is negative) per dollar of ex-
ports f.o.b. of the ith commodity, expressed as a percent of the
f.o.b. price.
1 + + r,
= the ad valorem tariff on the ith commodity.
1 + + t1,
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With this notation the various exchange rate and devaluation concepts are
readily defined. A gross deyaluation is Lhe nominal, or parity
rate base may be either the local or the foreign currency; that is, the
parity rate may be defined in terms of the number of units of local currency
per unit of foreign currency or in terms of the number of units of foreign cur-
rency per unit of local currency. It makes little difference which definition is
used as long as one is used consistently when comparing magnitudes of
devaluation among various countries. The analysis in this book uses the
former definition, which is essentially a "price of foreign exchange."
The amount of devaluation is usually expressed as a percentage change in
the parity rate. This amount based on foreign currency does not equal the
percentage gross devaluation defined in terms of local currency.3
Effective exchange rates (EERs) are nominal exchange rates plus the
various pricing charges superimposed upon the of those
charges per unit of foreign exchange 'fo exchange rate should yield
the amount of local currency actually paid (or received) per unit of foreign cur-
rency of imports c.i.f. (or exports f.o.b.). It is extremely important to note
that the EER concept pertains to the rate at which local currency units
translate into foreign currency for various transactions.
In the absence of quantitative restrictions, the EER for a particular com-
modity times its foreign price should yield an estimate of the domestic price net
of domestic handling charges. When quantitative restrictions are present, the
difference between the domestic price and that estimate represents the
premium on a unit of the commodity in question. EERs, therefore, represent
something akin to a "true nominal tariff" or "true subsidy" in the absence of
quantitative restrictions.6 When quantitative restrictions are present, estimates
of EERs must be employed, along with domestic-price/foreign-price com-
parisons, in order to estimate the premiums generated by quantitative restric-
tions.
Although there is nothing conceptually complicated about EERs, obtain-
ing data with which to estimate them is often something else again. Baldwin's
explanation of his procedures for estimating EERs aptly illustrates this:
The pattern of a high degree of protection from import competition to domestic pro-
ducers of nonessential goods and a low degree of protection to Local producers of essen-
tial consumer goods and essential producer goods began to emerge by 1951. Tariffs were
still not being imposed on U.S. imports because of the preferences granted American
goods, but the base of the sales tax on luxury items was changed to grant protection to
local producers equivalent to a 50 per cent duty. A slight degree of protection, 1.75 per
cent, resulted from similar sales tax changes for essential consumer goods. In addition,
the special 17 per cent excise tax on sales of foreign exchange was levied in 1951, but
with essential consumer goods and capital goods for "new and necessary" industries be-
ing exempted from this tax. Thus, in addition to the protective effects of the 80 per cent
margin-deposit requirement (0.024 x P2.000 = P0.05), the EER for imports of
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nonessential consumer goods exceeded the official figure of P2 per dollar both because
of the discriminatorY sales tax (0.5 x P2.00 = P1.00) and the 17 per cent special excise
tax on foreign exchange sales (0.17 X P2.00 P0.34). The combined impact of these
taxes is an EER of P2.00 + P0.05 + P1.00 + P0.34 = P3.39 per U.S. dollar.'
A similar estimation procedure must be repeated for each category of com-
modities for which the set of applicable charges differs and also for each time
the charges change.
The amount of net devaluation is the percentage change in the EER. The
difference between gross and net devaluation can be called the replacement
component of a parity change. The difficulty, of course, is that there is no
single number to represent "the" EER. Most country authors did not even at-
tempt to estimate a single number as generally valid, but used weighting
schemes to estimate the import and export EERs.'
Gross and Net Devaluations
Table 5-1 gives estimates of the parity exchange rates and EERs for imports
and exports before and after each of the twenty-two Phase III episodes. The
final three columns give the percentage devaluation for the parity rate and for
import and export EERs. As already indicated, the import and export EERs
are weighted averages of individual rates and provide only a rough indication
of the order of magnitude of the net devaluation experienced in each Phase III
episode.
PROBLEMS OF ESTIMATION
As can be seen from the notes to Table 5-1 and even more from the discus-
sions of the estimates in the individual country studies, it is no simple matter to
provide an estimate of the amount of gross devaluation, much less of net
devaluation. Much of the difficulty is inherent in the nature of Phase II: by the
time a country has decided to devalue its currency, controls and detailed
categories of exchange rates have multiplied to the extent that it is often not
obvious which—if any—exchange rate should be used to represent the parity
exchange rate. For example, Brazil (1957), Chile (1956, 1959 and 1965), Col-
ombia (1962), and the Philippines (1960-1962) all embarked upon Phase 111
episodes from a regime of multiple exchange rates, and the official rate was
meaningless except for a few small categories of government transactions. In
contrast, Turkey imposed an almost uniform import tax of TL6.20 per dollar
in August 1958, but did not officially alter the exchange rate for two years.9
Another problem of some importance is that Phase III episodes often
cover a period of several months or years. Not only is the question of timing
Table 5-1. Gros
Ten Countries
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Devaluari
Year
Brazil 1957
1961
1964
Chile 1956
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Colombia 1951-5
19 57.5
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1965
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South Korea 1961
1964
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Table 5-1. Gross and Net Devaluations Accompanying Phase Ill Episodes,
Ten Countries
73
Country
Devaluation
Year
(local curre
Exchange Rates
ncy units per U.S. dollar)
Devaluation
(percent increase
in currency units
per U.S. dollar)
•
Official Parity Effective Exchange Rates
Imports Exports Import Export
Old New Old New Old New Gross EER EER
Brazil 1957
1961
1964
65.6 90.5
205.1 318.5
620.0 1850.0
68 112 53 65
263 381 160 245
887 2253 884 1874
38 65 23
55 45 53
198 154 111
Chile 1956
1959
1965
.181 .351
.715 1.049
2.418 3.237
.219 .432 .181 .351
.846 1.524 .715 1.049
2.850 3.847 2.471 3.310
94 97 94
47 80 47
34 35 34
Colombia 1951-52
1957-58
1962
1965
1967-68
1.95 2.50
2.50 5.31
8.79 11.14
12.74 13.50
13.50 15.82
n.a. na. 2.86 2.82
n.a. na. 5.57 5.71
n.a. na. 8.85 10.34
n.a. n.a. 12.65 12.91
n.a. n.a. 13.40 16.71
28 na. —1
112 n.a. 3
27 n.a. 17
6 n.a. 2
17 na. 25
Egypt 1962 35.2 43.5 41.5 42.9 42.2 43.5 23 3 3
Ghana 1967 .71 1.02 1.08 1.50 .59 .84 44 39 42
India 1966 4.775 7.576 6.63 9.23 5.51 6.79 59 39 23
Israel 1952
1962
.36 .70
1.80 3.00
.40 .81 .41 .81
2.60 3.47 2.66 3.02
97 107 98
67 33 14
South Korea 1961
1964
62.5 127.5
130 214
100.2 147.0 147.6 150.6
148.1 247.0 189.4 281.4
104 47 2
65 67 49
Philippines 1960-62
1970
2.00 2.95
3.90 6.40
3.27 4.13 2.00 3.15
5.82 8.70 3.90 5.15
48 26 57
64 49 32
Turkey 1958-59
1970
na. = not available.
2.80 9.00
9.00 15.00
5.94 17.90 3.17 5.87
16.34 23.99 9.96 12.90
221 201 85
67 47 34
Source: Except as otherwise noted, parity rates were obtained from International Monetary
Fund, International Financial Statistics. All other data are from individual country studies, as
follows:
Brazil—Parity rates for 1957 taken as the "free rate" as given in International Financial
Statistics. Export and import effective exchange rates given by Fishlow; export rate is for
commodities other than coffee.
Q9ile—The export EER is that applicable to the so-called "legal cost of production" for
large-scale mining. For other exports, movements in the EER are generally parallel to those in
the large-scale mining rate.
Colombia—Parity data are from Dthz-Alejandro, Table 4-8, and are the average nominal rates for
the end of the relevant quarter. Dihz was unable to obtain the data to estimate import EERs.
Export data are an average of the minor export rate, given in Dfaz's Table 2-9, and the coffee
rate, with the latter given a weight proportionate to its share in export earnings in the year in
question.
Egypt—Net devaluation figures based on December 1961 ("old") and May 1962 ("new")
arrangements. See Hansen and Nashashibi for details.
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Table 5-1 (cont.)
Ghana—Leith, Tables 2-1 and 2-2.
India—All data are from Bhagwati and Srinivasan, Table 2-1. Choice of an export EER follows
their discussion in note 1 to that table.
Israel—All data are from Michaely, Table 5-1. The 1952 "new" parity figure is a weighted
average of formal rates; the parity was adjusted in December 1953. See Michaely, p. 120.
South Korea—Parity rates are the average official rates over the years before and during the
devaluations, i.e., 1960 and 1961; and 1963 and 1964. Actual devaluations were from 100 to
130 won to the dollar in February 1961, and from 130 to 255 won to the dollar in May 1964
combined with a float to 270 won to the dollar by August 1964. The effective exchange rates
are averages for the same set of years.
Philippines—The export rate given in Column 6 for 1960-1962 is for traditional exports for
1962.
Turkey—The import EER fell from TLI7.90 per dollar in August 1958 to TL14.31 per dollar in
December 1958, and the export EER reached TL9 per dollar by August 1960.
significant for evaluation of real exchange rate changes, but even characteriza-
tion of the exchange rate change has a time dimension. South Korea provides a
good example. The South Korean devaluation of May 1964 moved the dollar
exchange rate from 130 won to 255 won, but the rate was then allowed to float,
and it reached 270 won per dollar by August 1964. The Philippines similarly
their 1960-1962 exchange rate alteration over a fairly long period, in-
troducing new (multiple) rates in 1960 and gradually narrowing the spread of
rates until there was virtual unification at the new rate in 1962. Chile's
episodes also were characterized by gradual rate changes over a period of time.
In these instances the path of the exchange rate during the Phase 111 episodes is
of significance in analyzing the effects of the devaluation.
Even more complex are the cases where devaluation consists essentially of
a move from reliance upon quantitative restrictions to greater dependence
upon pricing via the introduction of multiple exchange rates. The Israeli Phase
III episode of 1952-1955 provides a perfect example. As Michaely has describ-
ed, Israel experienced huge inflationary pressures in the early years of her ex-
istence. Prices were left virtually unaltered, however, as physical allocations
were the rule of the day. In 1952 a gradual shift toward reliance on pricing
began. Multiple exchange rates were introduced, although the official parity
was left completely unchanged. Over the next three years, commodity and
other transactions were shifted between exchange rate categories; this enabled
the authorities to increase the degree of reliance upon the price mechanism. In
all these cases the varying time period during which changes took place com-
plicates the task of analyzing the devaluation. The fact that even measuring the
parity change is difficult only serves to underline the notion that examination
of a single number cannot provide very much information about the underly-
ing economic mechanism.
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MAGNITUDE OF GRoss DEVALUATIONS
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The column of Table 5-1 showing the magnitude of gross devaluation in
each instance of a Phase III episode represents the percentage increase in the
official parity (or its closest approximation) given in the first two columns.
As can be seen, most of the gross devaluations have been quite sizable:
only three involved less than a 25 percent increase in the nominal price of
foreign exchange. In four cases the gross devaluation exceeded 100 percent;
that happened in Brazil in 1964, where the exchange rate was altered from
Cr$620 to Cr$ 1850 per U.S. dollar, and also in Colombia in 1957/58, in South
Korea in 1961, and in Turkey in 1958. The Israeli devaluation of 1952 virtually
doubled the price of foreign exchange, and many more devaluations involved
increases of much more than 50 percent. These numbers stand in glaring con-
trast to the magnitude of exchange rate alterations in industrialized countries;
the British devaluation of 15 percent in 1967 was regarded as large; the
depreciation of the American dollar after 1971 seemed to many observers to
have been sizable, and yet it never reached 25 percent.
NET DEVALUATION
The middle columns of Table 5-1 give the EERs for imports and exports
before and after each Phase III episode. One point that is extremely important
is the considerable differential between export and import EERs, both before
and after Phase III episodes. In Ghana, for example, the average import EER
was 1.08 before devaluation and 1.50 afterward. Export EERs, by contrast,
were 0.59 and 0.84, respectively—about half the levels of the comparable im-
port EERs. The relationship of import and export EERs, along with the
premiums on QRs, is an important determinant of the bias of the trade and
payments regime, which is discussed in Chapter 6.
For present purposes the phenomenon of note is the wide divergence
possible between nominal and effective exchange rates. It is the EERs, and not
the nominal exchange rates, that are relevant for most purposes, and it is evi-
dent that one cannot use the nominal exchange rate as a proxy. The final col-
umns of Table 5-1 compare the percentages of gross devaluation and net
devaluations for imports and for exports.
In Israel's 1962 Phase III episode, for example, the nominal devaluation
was 67 percent, while the import EER rose 33 percent and the export FER in-
creased only 14 percent. The differences were explained by Michaely as
follows:
On the export side, the difference between the formal and effective rates of
devaluation was achieved by the abolition of most export subsidies. Since the sub-
sidies had been applied partly in fashion, their abolition resulted in
greater uniformity of the effective-rate system in exports.
In imports, the lower rate of increase of effective rates—compared with the
rate of formal devaluation—was due to the lowering of many tariff rates (as well
as the automatic decline of rates which were specific rather than ad
valorem—aithough this factor was not very significant in Israel). . . .'°
In most cases gross devaluation exceeded net devaluation for both exports
and imports. The extreme case is probably Egypt, where the 23 percent formal
devaluation resulted in only a 3 percent change in EERs for both exports and
imports after the government had removed import surcharges and export sub-
sidies and. inducements that had built up over the period since the early 1950s.
In most instances, however, the net devaluation was sizable, even if smaller
than the gross devaluation. In a few instances devaluations have been accom-
panied by measures that increased the EERs even more than the parity rate.
For example, in Brazil in 1957 a tariff system was introduced simultaneously
with devaluation, resulting in a 65 percent increase in the average import EER,
although the gross devaluation was only 38 percent.
Insofar as the EER represents the combined product of the exchange rate
and of special charges and subsidies, the two elements may be viewed as
substitutes; that is, the effect of devaluation may be offset by the effect of ad-
justing other factors affecting the domestic price of foreign exchange. At first
glance one would expect that economic behavior would be unaffected by the
proportion of the EER that represented the exchange rate itself and the pro-
portion that represented special tariffs and charges or incentives and subsidies.
After all, it is the EER that represents the "price" of a unit of foreign curren-
cy, and that is the "price" that theory suggests is relevant. By and large the
evidence from the country studies suggests that the naive expectation is cor-
rect. Authors in most instances worked with changes in the EERs and regarded
them as relevant variables.
One can, however, conjure up examples in which that might not be the
case. If governments can more readily manipulate the nonexchange rate com-
ponents of the EER, greater certainty might attach to exchange rate changes
than to subsidies and surcharges, and thus one might have a different response
to the same EER change depending on its composition. This is especially true
of short-run expectations surrounding devaluation. The 1958 Turkish devalua-
tion, for example, was not an exchange rate change.' It was accomplished by
manipulating taxes and subsidies rather than by a formal alteration of the ex-
change rate. There seems little doubt that altering the exchange rate would
have led to less uncertainty about the future path of the EER. There was pro-
bably more speculation against the Turkish lira following devaluation than
would have occurred had the EER change been accomplished by a parity
change.
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Among the ten country studies, only in the case of South Korea did the
authors feel that the difference between the formal and informal components
of EERs might be significant enough to evaluate separately the effects of the
exchange rate and other components of the EER. In South Korea during the
entire period following 1960, export incentives were granted over and above
the exchange rate itself. The nonformal component of the rate was frequently
adjusted. As Table 5-1 shows, the export EER was well above the parity rate
both before and after each Phase III episode. Indeed, the export EER changed
very little with the 1961 devaluation.
South Korea's significant and frequent variation in the importance of the
noriformal component of the EER, without any obvious relation to the phases
of the regime, permitted the sensitivity of exports to each component to be
tested. As explained by the authors:
The sensitivity of exports can be tested by using exports of manufactured goods
(XGM) as the dependent variable, and nonagricultural output (YNA), the official
exchange rate on a purchasing-power-parity basis (ORD), and all other export in-
centives (i.e., a combination of multiple exchange rate premiums and subsidies
denoted by SUBX) as explanatory variables. If the whole period 1955 to 1970 is
included, the results are very poor. From 1957 to 1970, we obtain the following
result:
XGM = —241.4847 + 0.3323YNA + 0.26290RD + 0.1471SUBX
(—3.92) (11.29) (1.70) (1.27)
Estimation Technique: Cochrane-Orcutt Iterative Technique
R2 = 0.9900
d = 1.3742
= 0.8701
The coefficient of YNA is highly significant, which indicates that general capacity
in nonagriculture is the most significant factor explaining exports. . . . The
elasticity of manufactured exports with respect to changes in the exchange rate
(ORD) is 2.14 and with respect to export subsidies is 0.95. The coefficients of the
official exchange rate ORD and the subsidy level of exports, SUBX, however, are
not significant.
When the authors used the period 1963 to 1970 (for which there is reason to
believe structural change had already occurred), they obtained elasticities
equal to 6.16 for ORD and 4.69 for SUBX, although the degrees of freedom
are limited for the period as a whole, and the range of variation is small. The
evidence is, therefore, far from definitive, but suggests that in the South
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Korean case the exchange rate itself may have had somewhat more impact on
economic behavior than the nonformal component of the EER. That result,
however, appears to have been the exception, and even there the magnitude of
the difference is not overwhelming.
II. REAL EXCHANGE RATE CHANGES
It is not EERs per se that are of importance, but rather it is the relative price of
tradables to nontradables and of exportables to import-substitutes and impor-
tables. In theory, therefore, a price adjustment should be made to estimate the
change in the real exchange rate (that is, to arrive at price-level-deflated effec-
tive exchange rates, or PLD-EERs) following devaluation. In practice,
recognizing the role of price level changes involves a number of problems.
Quite aside from the usual problems of variance in EERs and of finding an ap-
propriate price index, there is a question about the appropriate time period for
making the adjustment. These difficulties may be of considerable significance
empirically, and they deserve attention, even though satisfactory solutions are
not at hand.
Variation in the Real Exchange Rate and Expectations
A difficult theoretical problem, and one that will not be dealt with here, is how
to separate the effects of variation in the real exchange rate from those caused
by uncertainty about the future course of the real exchange rate. It is virtually
impossible to develop an internally consistent model within which the future
path of the exchange rate is known with certainty and makes discrete jumps;
speculative pressures would prevent realization of that path unless the
behavior of the domestic nominal interest rate were bizarre. Moreover, if these
difficulties could be overcome, a problem would arise as to how production
and consumption decisions would change relative prices over time; producers
and consumers could always stockpile, and inventories would adjust unless
storage costs were very high. Although a satisfactory analytical model has not
been developed, the response to changes in the nominal, and also the real, ex-
change rate must be affected by the facts that inflation rates vary, that in some
countries exchange rate changes are large and infrequent, and that there is
uncertainty both about future inflation rates and about the timing and
magnitude of future devaluations.
Consider, for example, the Chilean experience since 1950. Table 5-2
presents Chilean PLD-EERs for several categories of commodities for years
surrounding the three Chilean Phase III episodes. These rates include the
premium on import licenses and thus cover the effects of QRs as well as price
measures.'2 Whil
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rates include the
.s as well as price
measures.'2 While there are many other real rates reported by Behrman, the
behavior of those other rates is not dissimilar to that reported in Table 5-2. In
the absence of information about the date of the Chilean devaluations, it
would be very difficult for an observer of the data in Table 5-2 to infer when
those devaluations took place. To illustrate with the 1956 devaluation, of the
five real exchange rates shown, two were higher in 1955 than in 1956 or 1957,
while three were higher in 1957 than in 1956. Moreover, insofar as there is a
discernible pattern over time, it would suggest chronic appreciation of most
real rates. While 1959 and 1965 show some net real devaluation, the order of
magnitude of the change is not very much greater than changes that occurred
in other, nondevaluation years.
Given past experience it would seem plausible that Chileans would come
to expect periodic devaluations, and that after devaluation they would expect
future erosion in the real exchange rate. After all, the pattern of the three
devaluations reported here had also been experienced in the years prior to
World War II. To the extent that periodic devaluations are expected, there is a
question as to how much the current real exchange rate wOuld affect produc-
tion decisions. Even if the real exchange rate prevailing immediately after a
devaluation made certain export activities appear profitable, most en-
Table 5-2. Chilean PLD-EERS for Five Commodity Groups for Years
Surrounding Phase Ill Episodes
1965 Escudos per Dollar
Agriculture Manu-
Year and Forestry Mining lecturing Imports Exports
1954 5.488 3.792 7.610 4.756 3.123
1955 5.940 3.390 8.805 4.560 3.380
1956a 5.460 4.040 8.585 5.498 4104
1957 5.238 4.123 8.248 7.559 4.338
1958 4.557 4.435 7.797 6.679 3.521
1959a 4.501 3.953 7.531 6.861 4.002
1960 4.717 3.860 7.302 6.065 3.773
1961 4.668 3.526 6.888 5.517 3.297
1964 4.593 3.134 6.365 5.462 3.309
1965a 4.120 3.515 6.373 5.489 3.739
1966 4.035 3.297 5.956 4.793 4.046
1967 4.137 2.913 5.626 4.734 3.650
Note: Data are for premium-inclusive exchange rates.
Source: Behrman, Table A-8.
aDevaluatjon year.
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trepreneurs would presumably anticipate reduction in profitability in years
ahead as domestic wage and price increases outpaced the nominal exchange
rate alterations.
Quite aside from expectations of future erosion of the real exchange rate,
year-to-year variation in the Chilean real exchange rate was quite sizable: the
export real exchange rate, for example, fell 19 percent between 1957 and 1958.
Indeed, for the entire period from 1946 to 1970, the mean export real EER was
3.939, with a standard deviation of 0.557, giving a variance of 0.141. For some
other rates, variance was even higher.
Variance such as that experienced in Chile may, itself, be of significance
and may affect responses to devaluation. It seems evident, therefore, that no
single number can adequately characterize the behavior of the real exchange
rate around Phase III; furthermore, the same percentage change in the real ex-
change rate might elicit very different responses in countries with differing
past histories.
Considerations such as these were part of the motivation for the in-
dividual country studies; analysis can be satisfactory only when undertaken in
the context of the history, institutions, and economic policies in each in-
dividual country. Any particular measure of the real rate is by itself inadequate
to cover all the influences on responses in individual countries.
Real Exchange Rates and Equilibrium Rates
Attempts to measure equilibrium exchange rates have proved largely un-
satisfactory. All that can be observed is changes in the real exchange rate. Even
if one knew the real equilibrium rate for a particular period, there is no a priori
reason to believe that the same real rate would remain an equilibrium rate over
time.
There is, however, some reason to believe that, in the absence of sharp
terms-of-trade changes, year-to-year changes in the equilibrium rate are likely
to be rather small. First, there is the experience of the industrial countries,
whose exchange rate changes have been rather small for the greater part,
especially if one makes allowances for different rates of inflation. Second, in
the absence of terms-of-trade changes, theory suggests that only sharply dif-
fering rates of growth of demand for importables (net of domestic supply) and
of exports (net of home demand) would require an adjustment in the price of
tradables relative to home goods. In general, significant differences in the two
growth rates seem to arise mostly because of inflationary monetary and fiscal
policies, and the magnitude of the real exchange rate adjustments required is
probably small in most cases.
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Thus, without knowing the equilibrium real EER, one can infer that inflation,
with constant nominal EERs, implies increasing overvaluation (or reduced
undervaluation) of the currency, even after one year.
To be sure, there are exceptions. In Chile in the 1960s, for example, the
rise in the price of copper permitted liberalization of trade without any change
in the real exchange rate and thus represented a fortuitous circumstance that
altered the equilibrium real rate. If the same real exchange rate had been sus-
tained in Ghana in spite of the decline in the world price of cocoa, it would
have been increasingly overvalued; the measured decline in the real exchange
rate therefore probably underestimates the increased departure of the
Ghanaian cedi from its equilibrium real rate.
The analysis that follows focuses on changes in real rates, rather than on
how they differ from equilibrium rates. Those changes are being interpreted as
a proxy for the relevant variable. For most of the countries in the project the
difficulty is not too great as long as focus is on the response of exports and
other variables to changes in the real exchange rate. What is impossible,
however, is any comparison of the degree of overvaluation across countries.
To a certain extent, background knowledge of a particular country, combined
with observation of movements in the real exchange rate, can be used to make
fairly strong inferences about the probable extent of currency overvaluation.
This approach, confined to one country, may be defensible even though there
are analytical difficulties. To make any comparisons of the degree of over-
valuation across countries, however, would be extremely hazardous, and no
such inferences should be drawn from the data presented below.
Behavior or Real EERS
Even if the equilibrium real rate were constant over time, prices move con-
tinuously, whereas net devaluations are usually made in discrete jumps. Find-
ing a number to represent the amount of real devaluation therefore requires
the selection of a time period. Compare, for example, the Chilean net devalua-
tion of 1956 with the Indian net devaluation of 1966. Chile increased import
and export EERs about 95 percent, while India raised hers by 20 to 40 percent.
Those percentages represent the proportionate nominal net devaluations and,
in a sense, the instantaneous real devaluation. However, in 1966 India was ex-
periencing an inflation rate of about 10 percent per annum, while Chile's infla-
tion rate in 1956 had been about 75 percent. Chile's devaluation was the larger
during the month in which it took place, but India's devaluation restored her
real exchange rate to the level of about five years previously, while Chile's
T
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devaluation increased the real price of foreign exchange only to the level of massive mere
about fifteen months earlier. Even that, as Table 5-2 indicates, was partially quantitative
offset. 1960-1962
or
The important question relates to the time period during which a real ex- devaluatio:w
change rate must be maintained in order to induce changes in economic rates for tradit
behavior. It seems reasonable to infer that there is some time interval that increased th
would induce producers to alter behavior, even if they knew that at a later date the Turkish infl
prices would revert to their former level. If, for example, it takes one year to a
shift production strategies, and individuals in both India and Chile expected
inflation to proceed at its rate of the preceding year, Indian producers would
have been responding to an increase of about 30 percent in the real exchange Table 5-3. Ne
rate, while Chileans would have been anticipating no more than a 20 percent Surrounding V
increase in the real rate by the time production shifted. Thus, in addition to the
effects of expectations, the cost of shifting the structure of production and the
length of time required to do it also affect responses to exchange rate changes. Deval
Table 5-3 traces the behavior of real exchange rates during the periods Country Y
around the twenty-two Phase III episodes. For purposes of comparison, the
Brazil 195
first column gives an indication of the order of magnitude of the net devalua- 196
tion—taken as the mean of the export and import EER changes given in the 196
last two columns of Table 5-1. The next four columns record the behavior of Chile 195
the real exchange rate for the four years surrounding the devaluation. For ease 195
of comparison, the real EER immediately after devaluation was set equal to 196
100 so that numbers less than 100 indicate a lower real EER and numbers Colombia 195
greater than 100 indicate a higher real EER—that is, a real devaluation. For 195
example, in Israel the inflation rate for the two years preceding the 1962 196
devaluation was greater than the percent increase in the EER for exports
(because export subsidies were removed). The purchasing-power-parity, price-
level-deflated EER (PPP-PLD-EER) for exports was therefore lower in 1962 Egypt 196
than it had been in 1960. Inflation in the two years following devaluation was Ghana 196
not offset by increases in export subsidies, so that the real export EER was India 196
about 12 percent lower two years after devaluation than it had been two years Israel 195
before. 196
It is evident from Table 5-3 that there have been sizable changes in real ex-
change rates surrounding Phase III episodes and, in general, inflation has South Korea 196
tended to result in an appreciation of the real exchange rate within a relatively 196
short time after devaluation. Exceptions are Brazil in 1957; Colombia in 1951, Philippines 196
1965, and 1967; Israel after 1952; the Philippines in 1960; and Turkey in 1958. 197
Brazil's increase was later eroded as inflation persisted, so the exception in that Turkey 195
case is more apparent than real. In Colombia the 1965 devaluation was follow- 197
ed by another two years later; in addition, the Colombian data are based on Percent Ne
currency units per Cthe minor export rate, which was rapidly adjusted to price changes after 1967. index of PLD-EER:
There are, therefore, only three genuine exceptions to the notion that, at a export rate PPP ac
fixed exchange rate, the real exchange rate is quickly eroded if devaluation is Statistics; Ghana—
Bhagwati-Snnivasaflto a new, fixed parity. In Israel the 1952 episode was accompanied by a Philippines—new ex
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'ttion was follow-
massive increase in the nominal exchange rate as Israel shifted away from
quantitative controls. The real exchange rate increased after the Philippine
1960-1962 episode because inflation rates were extremely low. In Turkey the
devaluation was initially accompanied by a failure to adjust fully the exchange
rates for traditional exports. Over the next two years these export EERs were
increased, thus maintaining constancy of the average export EER; in addition,
the Turkish inflation ended after the winter of 1959.
Country
Devaluation
Year
Net
Devaluation
(percent)
Index of PLD EER
(year of devaluation = 100)
Two Years
before
One Year One Year
before after
Two Years
after
Brazil 1957
1961
1964
44
49
132
109
86
98
97 108
92 101
83 101
132
85
84
Chile 1956
1959
1965
95
64
34
76
108
94
82 106
88 94
88 108
86
82
98
Colombia 1951/52
1957/58
1962
1965
1967
—1
3
17
2
25
125
80
65
91
98
119 121
108 79
88 73
96 91
89 105
121
83
77
102
107
Egypt 1962 3 102 103 101 96
Ghana 1967 40 75 70 87 80
India 1966 38 81 80 85 85
Israel 1952
1962
102
24
73
104
75 116
97 95
148
92
South Korea 1961
1964
24
58
113
87
111 92
91 98
95
96
Philippines 1960/62
1970
41
40
95
77
94 115
76 96
128
na.
Turkey 1958/59
1970
143
40
67
81
63 111
79 .1
114
81
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Table 5-3. Net Devaluation and Behavior of the Real Exchange Rate in
Surrounding Years, Ten Countries
ata are based on
ges after 1967.
notion that, at a
if devaluation is
companied by a
Percent Net Devaluation: Average of export and import percentage increases in
currency units per dollar from Table 5-1, except for Colombia, where the export rate is used;
index of PLD-EER: Brazil—export rate excluding coffee; Chile—export rate; Colombia—minor
export rate PPP adjusted; Egypt—export rate deflated by line 63, International Financial
Statistics; Ghana—export rate, noncocoa; India—import EER from Table 2-1 of
Bhagwati-Srinivasan; Israel—PPP adjusted export rate; South Korea—export rate;
Philippines—new export rate; Turkey —weigh ted export rate.
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The striking feature of the data in Table 5-1 compared with that in Table
5-3 is the wide disparity between the magnitudes of gross devaluation, net
devaluation, and real devaluation. Despite the very large numbers representing
the percentage for gross devaluation in Table 5-1, the largest real devalua-
tion—as of the year it took place—was 50 percent in Turkey in 1958/59, as the
real rate rose from 63 to 100. In ten instances the real devaluation was less than
10 percent (including those cases where the real rate appreciated). Even those
magnitudes were not sustained, as inflation continued to erode the real rate in
most cases.
In summary, the case has been made that real exchange rates, and varia-
tions in them, are the relevant variables to which producers respond. Varia-
tions occur in the real rates over time and also in the rates applicable to differ-
ing categories of transactions. All of these factors are important in evaluating
the outcome of exchange rate changes. In Chapter 6 the influence of other
components of the policy packages initiating Phase III- episodes—especially
the effect of changing premiums on import licenses and otherwise altering
QRs—will be examined.
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1. The fact that premiums accrue to import licenses alters the relationship that would other-
wise exist between EERs and foreign domestic prices, so analysis of the effects of EER changes
must be modified.
2. Typically, of course, liberalized regimes have tariffs as a part of the system. The amount of
local currency paid for one unit of imports c.i.f. is usually taken to equal the foreign price times
the exchange rate. Under liberalized regimes, tariff rates are usually ad valorem and seldom
change with devaluation. As a consequence the proportionate change in the parity exchange rate
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change for all but traditional exports. Thus, to all intents and purposes the exchange rate was TL9
= $1, and the 1MF so recorded it in International Financial Statistics. The official rate recorded
with the 1MF, however, was not altered until August 1960. The Turkish devaluation—and start of•
the Phase Ill episode—is nonetheless dated from August 1958.
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the change in foreign currency per unit of local currency is When using the
percentage increase in the price of foreign exchange as the measure, devaluation can exceed 100
percent if the price of foreign exchange more than doubles.
6. Effective rates of protection convert nominal tariff estimates into estimates of protection
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rates would therefore start with the use of the tariffs implied by the ratio of EERs to the nominal
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exchange rate. The difficulty with the terminology arises because the effective protection literature
implicitly assumes that tariffs are the only charges against imports. Once it is recognized that there
are often charges other than tariffs, a more precise terminology might be "nominal tariff,"total
tariff," and "value-added tariff," but the gain in precision would not warrant the confusion caus-
ed by attempting to alter an established terminology.
7. Baldwin, p.92-93.
8. There is no single weighting scheme that is appropriate, and the data presented in Table
5-1 should be taken as rough estimates of the magnitude of change. Some evidence on the extent of
variance in EERs and in the overall protection accorded by different regimes is reviewed in
Chapter 6.
9. On the export side, however, some traditional Turkish exports received considerably less
than 9 TL per dollar. See Krueger, Chapter IV, for details.
10. Michaely, p. 59.
11. Frank, Kim, and Westphal, p. 85.
12. The difference between the domestic-price/foreign-price relationship and the EERs is the
premium. For a more detailed discussion, see Chapter 6.
